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The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:
Examining Employees' Good Faith Duties
by
JEFFREY M. JUDD*

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is widely recognized as fundamental to the law of contracts.' Courts consistently construe this covenant as binding on all parties to a contract. 2 In a number
of cases dealing primarily with insurance contracts, several jurisdictions
use the implied covenant to permit relief in tort as well as in contract for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Courts have reasoned that relationships exhibiting certain "special"
qualities require the protections provided by tort remedies, which are
otherwise unavailable in contract actions. 3 In addition to recognizing a
tort theory for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts, courts have extended this theory to surety
contracts, 4 loan agreements, 5 commercial leases, 6 attorneys' fees agree*

Member, Third Year Class.

1.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978);

A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 654D, at 795 (Supp. 1980). The development of the
implied covenant can be traced back to Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y.
79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933); Brassil v. Maryland Casualty, 210 N.Y. 235, 242, 104 N.E.
622, 624 (1914); Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949);
Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 750-51, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947); and Universal Sales
Corp. v. California Press Mfg., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942).
2. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, 26 Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d
1038, 1041,164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70
Cal. App. 3d 789, 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977).
3. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69, 77779, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362, 368-69 (1984); Wallis v. Superior
Court (Kroehler Mfg. Co.), 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128-29
(1984).
4. Johnson v. Safeco Ins. of Am., 265 Ark. 9, 576 S.W.2d 220 (1979) (while holding
surety not in breach of implied covenant, the court recognized in dicta the appropriateness of
bad faith actions in the surety context, noting that a surety might have more defenses available
than an insurer in such an action); Fisher v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 125 Ill. App. 3d 632, 466
N.E.2d 332 (1984) (treating contracts of compensated suretyship as contracts of insurance in
bad faith actions); New Amsterdam Casualty v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 198 N.W.2d 543
(1972) (applying good faith insurance law to a surety, the court required an indemnitee to
communicate settlement offers to its indemnitors, or be limited in its recovery from indemnitors to the settlement amount). Other tortious breach of the implied covenant cases involving
sureties include French Am. Banking Corp. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 609 F. Supp.
[483]
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ments, 7 franchise agreements, 8 and various other non-insurance contracts. 9 Similarly, a number of courts allow a former employee to state a
tort cause of action against his former employer for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the employee's
termination.1°
1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Continental Realty Corp. v. Andrew J. Crevolin Co., 380 F. Supp. 246
(S.D. W.Va. 1974); and Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins., 11 Ohio St. 3d 6, 462 N.E.2d 415 (1984).
5. Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls, 704 P.2d 409 (Mont. 1985) (evidence
supporting finding of reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights as a customer justified jury instruction to consider tort damages for breach of the implied covenant); First Nat'l Bank v.
Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (bank's acceleration of loan and unilateral offset
against borrower's checking account was a breach of statutory duty to exercise good faith; tort
damages, including punitive damages, held justified and proper); cf Wagner v. Benson, 101
Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980) (although finding bank innocent of tortious conduct, court assumed that a bad faith cause of action may arise from a borrower-lender relationship); Sawyer v. Bank of Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) (tortious breach
of the implied covenant requires bad faith action, extraneous to the contract, with the motive
and intent to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment of contract rights).
6. Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins., 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985) (breach of the implied
covenant occurs when one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, and contrary
to the reasonable expectations of the other party).
7. Morse v. Espeland, 696 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1985) (analogizing to its decisions regarding
bad faith in the employment context, the court held an attorney owed his client a duty of good
faith and fair dealing when negotiating a fee and when ultimately charging and collecting the
fee).
8. Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148 (vont. 1986) (franchisor's refusal to
allow its franchisee to relocate its ice cream parlor was a breach of the implied covenant because it was based on a failure to properly review franchisee's request).
9. Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (all contracts, including those between
bank and commercial borrowers, require good faith performance); Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (dicta) (the
tort of bad faith breach available in noninsurance contract cases); Mitchell v. Bailey & Selover
Inc., 96 Nev. 147, 605 P.2d 1138 (1980) (U.C.C. obligation of good faith and fair dealing
applied to enforce warehouseman's lien); Hall v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla.
1985) (principal liable in tort for bad faith termination of agency); EKE Builders v. Quail Bluff
Assocs., 714 P.2d 604 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (implied covenant to act in good faith and deal
fairly inheres in all contracts).
10. Petersen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 617 F. Supp. 1039 (D.V.I. 1985) (following
Robinson v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 19 V.I. 106 1982), recognizing good faith limitation
to the "at-will" rule); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (Nevada
recognizes cause of action for breach of the implied covenant); Craft v. Metromedia, 572 F.
Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11.
1983)
(relying on Rhode Island precedent in the insurance context, the court held that breach of the
implied covenant sounds in tort as well as contract, and punitive damages may be awarded
where the employer demonstrates malice, or willful and wanton conduct); Robinson, 19 V.I.
106 (recognizing the good faith limitation on the "at-will" employment rule); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (implied covenant protects

employee from discharge based on the employer's desire to avoid paying benefits already
earned); Cook v. Alexander & Alexander, 40 Conn. Sup. 246, 488 A.2d 1295 (1985) (approving application of the good faith theory in employment contracts "inthe restricted manner
illustrated by the Massachusetts cases"); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d
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This Note argues that, consistent with this trend, under appropriate
circumstances a court might find that an employee who abuses a special
position of trust and confidence is liable to his employer for tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in his employment contract. Although no court has yet advanced this application
of the implied covenant, I"no current legal authority clearly prevents an
employer from asserting such a claim against an employee. 12
At least three factors suggest that an employer's cause of action for
tortious breach of the implied covenant may sometimes be appropriate.
First, courts that recognize a tort theory for breach of the implied covenant are primarily concerned with the abuse of some "special relation282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985) (seven years insufficient to justify implied covenant claims),
review granted, 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, 712 P.2d 891 (1986); Khanna v.
Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985) (implied covenant breach
established whenever employer engages in bad faith action with intent to interfere with employee's contract rights); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984) (implied covenant requires an employer to treat like cases alike when applying corporate policy); Newfield v. Ins. Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984)
(implied covenant claim requires combination of elements, especially longevity of service);
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984)
(implied covenant requires more than three and a half years employment, employer's failure to
follow its express policy, or bad faith action extraneous to the contract); Crozier v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983) (employee must prove
facts establishing breach of implied covenant); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (termination of employee without legal cause after 18 years of
service); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984) (following Gates
v. Life of Montana, 196 Mont. 178, 668 P.2d 213 (1983)); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg.,
687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984) (same); Gates v. Life of Montana, 196 Mont. 178, 668 P.2d 213
(1983) ("breach of a duty to deal fairly and in good faith in the employment relationship is a
tort for which punitive damages can be recovered" for sufficiently culpable conduct).
Other states have expressly refused to impose a good faith standard in employment contracts. See, eg., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982); Morriss
v. Coleman Co., Inc., 241 Kan. 501, 512, 738 P.2d 841, 851 (1987); Bottijliso v. Hutchison
Fruit, 96 N.M. 789, 794-95, 635 P.2d 992, 997-98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 572-73, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983).
11. In Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, No. 85-2176, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1987), the first case to explicitly address the issue, a federal district court applying California law prevented the defendant
in a wrongful discharge case from counterclaiming for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing against its former employee. Finding the claim "spurious," id. at 481,
the court reasoned that "only 'the party in the stronger position,' i.e., the employer, can be
held liable in tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an
employment contract." Id. at 479. A literal application of Hudson's language might prevent a
court from ever finding an employee liable for tortious breach of the implied covenant.
12. Besides Hudson, no court has ruled on such a claim. Therefore, in most jurisdictions,
the question of a claim for employee's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing will be one of first impression. Id. at 478.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

ship."1 3 Therefore, when the employee abuses some "special
relationship," such as a position of extraordinary trust and confidence,
the employer should be able to state a cause of action against the em4
ployee for breach of the implied covenant.'
Second, the employee has always owed specific common-law duties
to his employer in tort, implied in law by virtue of the employment relationship, or, more recently, by the employment contract. It is a small
analytical leap to see these employee duties as specific examples of the
broader duties contained within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
Third, in the context of insurance contract litigation, from which
tortious breach of the implied covenant actions were derived, the courts
seem willing to allow an insurer to assert a claim of breach of the implied
covenant against its insured.15 Since cases extending liability for breach
of the implied covenant to the employer have likened the employer to the
insurer,' 6 the employer should similarly be allowed to assert implied covenant actions against its employees.
Part I of this Note briefly analyzes the evolution of a cause of action
for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
from its insurance case origins to its application in the wrongful termination context. The "special relationship" elements common to, and essential for, the assertion of tortious breach of the implied covenant are
considered in the context of an employee's potential breach of the implied covenant.
Part II analyzes the traditional common-law torts that recognize
specific, affirmative duties owed by the employee to his employer and
examines their common underlying "good faith" elements. The employee's common-law duties illustrate that the level of trust given to an
employee will often determine the standard of conduct to which the employee will be held in performing these duties. Finally, the Note reviews
the common law of employee duties to show gaps in the protection cur13. See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
14. The tort remedy discussed herein would be extremely limited in application. Practically, the trust and confidentiality requirement limits the class of potential defendants to employees such as managers, creative talent, research and development personnel, and
supervisors. This limitation is consistent with the line of cases distinguishing insurance and
other contracts displaying "quasi-fiduciary" elements from ordinary commercial contracts.
See infra notes 101-06, 186-98 and accompanying text.
Commentators and courts have expressed the justifiable concern that, if tortious breach
cases are not limited, virtually any breach of contract will be subject to tort damages. See infra
notes 212-17 and accompanying text. An action available to employers against employees
without limitation would likely discourage employees from asserting their lawful rights. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 480.
15. See infra notes 147-64 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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rently available to an employer for damages caused by an employee's acts
in breach of the implied covenant.
Using the insurance case analogy and the "special relationship" concept, part III constructs a theory for an employee's tortious breach of the
implied covenant. The viability of this theory is then analyzed in light of
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, the only case that has addressed the
issue of employee liability under the covenant. This analysis queries
when, if ever, the employee should be liable in tort to his employer for
breach of the implied covenant.
This Note concludes that, in theory, an employer should be able to
state an independent claim or affirmative defense based on tortious
breach of the employee's duty of good faith and fair dealing. This Note
suggests that the limited application of such an action and the resulting
chilling effect it would have on employees' assertions of their rights
against employers confine the theory's usefulness and desirability to defensive applications.

I.

Origin of the Good Faith Tort Action

Traditionally, courts treated breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing 17 as a breach of contract, and limited damages recoveries to those normally awarded in contract actions. 18 In more recent
17. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) comment a discusses the
meaning of "good faith," by referring to U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1979) ("honesty in fact in the
conduct of transaction") and U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (standard of merchants is "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"). U.C.C.
§ 1-201(19) requires a subjective element ("honesty" being a state of mind) as the standard for
all parties to sales of goods contracts, while § 2-103(1)(b) adds the objective standard of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," imposed on merchants.
A number of commentators consider the meaning of "good faith" to be a function of the
context within which it operates. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
ReasonablenessUnder the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666, 668-72 (1963);
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207-15 (1968). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 205 (1979) apparently endorses this view. See id. comments b-e; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (concept stated in
terms of the "nature and extent" of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as being "contingent
upon the purpose of the particular contract"), appeal'dismissed,cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912
(1980).
In non-U.C.C. cases, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is found in Brown v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949): "In every contract there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which injures the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Id. at 564, 212 P.2d at 881 (citation omitted).
For a comprehensive list of cases recognizing a general obligation of good faith performance in
every contract at common law, see Burton, Breach of Contractand the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 404 (1980).
18. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383, 710 P.2d 1025, 1038
(1985) (the duty not to act in bad faith or deal unfairly becomes a part of the contract, and, as
with any other element of the contract, the remedy for its breach generally is on the contract
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years, courts have allowed recovery in tort 9 in "special relationship"
situations. 20 The basic rationale behind this development lies in the fundamental differences between tort and contract remedies and the public
policy goals of each.
A principal distinction between tort and contract actions for breach
21
of the implied covenant is the relief available to prevailing plaintiffs.
Generally speaking, the purposes of tort liability are to compensate for
injuries and to deter wrongful conduct. 22 Punitive or exemplary damages are available to a plaintiff who can prove an element of outrage,
such as malice, fraud, or willful and wanton behavior. 23 Tort law thus
itself); Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985) (distinguishing intentional contract breaches motivated by self-interest which justify contract damages from other
egregious acts that give rise to tort damages); see Summers, supra note 17, at 216-20 (development of good faith causes of action); see also Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg., 20
Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942) (dispute over a contract for the purchase of machinery); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 97, 364 N.E. 2d 1251, 1253 (1977)
(dispute over commissions earned from sales on behalf of employer); Wilson v. Mechanical
Orguinett, 170 N.Y. 542, 545, 63 N.E. 550, 550 (1902) (dispute over royalties accruing from
patent rights); Genet v. President of Del. & H. Canal, 136 N.Y. 593, 608, 32 N.E. 1078, 108182 (1893) (dispute over royalties accruing from a coal mine).
19. The first case recognizing a tort cause of action based on the implied covenant was
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 8-9, 231 N.W. 257, 258 (1930) (insurance),
holding clarified, 235 N.W. 413 (1931). Before Hilker, the courts recognized tort actions
against insurers to protect insureds from insurance adjustment abuses in third-party cases. See
S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS §§ 2:03-2:06 (1984). Hilker linked the implied covenant
articulated in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty, 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914) (an implied
promise that neither party would do anything to deprive the other party of the benefits of the
bargain), with the emerging tort cause of action for bad faith against insurers. See S. ASHLEY,
supra, §§ 2:03-2:06
A series of California insurance cases extended the implied covenant tort action to firstparty insurance cases. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169
Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); see also Kornblum, Recent
Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411,
431-32 (1980) (collecting cases); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978); Silberg v. California Life Ins., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
20. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 769, 686 P.2d
1158, 1166, 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362, 367 (1984); see also Aluevich v. Harrah's, 99 Nev.
215, 216, 660 P.2d 986, 987 (1983) (referring to the "special element of reliance such as that
found in partnership, insurance and franchise agreements"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984)
21. See Louderback & Jurika, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 191 (1982); Comment, ReconstructingBreach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1291-92 (1985).

22. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 655 (5th ed.
1984); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971) (tort remedies seek to deter injurers
rather than merely set a price for violations).
23. W. KEETON, supra note 22, § 2, at 9-12.
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promotes conduct that is socially 24reasonable and deters behavior that is
unreasonable or socially harmful.
Contract damages, on the other hand, traditionally do not distinguish between "willful" and other breaches. 25 In general, the law does
not attempt to compel contract performance with the threat of contract
damages. 26 Rather, the policy behind these damages encourages the
breach of promises when economically efficient. When the breach of a
promise creates value for the promisor in excess of the value expected by
the performance of the promise, the promisor is free to breach and pay
damages to the promisee, on the theory that society at large will benefit
economically.2 7 Because a breach of promise is not itself thought socially
harmful, courts have traditionally limited contract damages to place the
aggrieved party "in as good a[n economic] position as if the other party
' 28 Punitive damages are thus denied in breach of
had fully performed."
29
contract cases.
30
While economically efficient breaches of contract benefit society,

24. Id. §1,at6.
25. Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985) (intentional contract breaches motivated by self-interest justify contract damages only); see Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.").
26. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 106 (3d ed. 1986) ("[I]t is not the policy
of the law to compel adherence to contracts but only to require each party to choose between
performing in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party for any injury
resulting from a failure to perform.").
27. "Permitting parties to breach their contracts promotes an efficient economy, at least
when the gains from the breach exceed the expected pecuniary injuries of the promisee." Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended
Beyond Insurance Transactions, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 453-54 (1981). This theory of economic breach was acknowledged by the dissent in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 778-79, 686 P.2d 1158, 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 369 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
28. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344
(1979). The Hadley v. Baxendale rule further limits special damages to those known to the
breaching party at the time of contract formation. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (1854); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979) (damages
limited to those foreseen by breaching party at contract formation).
29. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 842 (1982). This is generally true, regardless how malicious the breach. See Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 219 (1977); see also Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 893 (1986) (discussing limitations on punitive damage awards in contract actions).
30. By limiting contract damages, society benefits by the increased production of goods
and services at lower overall cost, according to the theory of "economic" or "efficient" breach.
See generally A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979) (essay analyzing economics of contract remedies); R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 108 (requiring a
breaching party to complete a breached contract often results in a waste of resources); Barton,
The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract,Damage Measures, and Economic
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courts have begun to recognize that in some cases a party may abuse the
power to breach in some circumstances, resulting in unfavorable social
consequences. 3' The creation of a tort action for breach of the implied
covenant is judicial recognition that breach of some contracts is likely to
conflict with public policy considerations. 32 Thus, the courts seek to deter parties from breaching certain contracts with the threat of the increased exposure of tort damages. 33 This idea is well-illustrated by the
California insurance cases.
A.

The Insurance Cases

While California courts were not the first to recognize special duties
of good faith in insurance contracts, 34 they often lead other states in recEfficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970) (discussing economic theory of contract damages);
Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract, 1969
DUKE L.J. 49 (same). This "efficiency" approach is strongly criticized for ignoring the moral
obligation to honor one's promises and for assuming an ability to measure the value of breach
that exceeds the capabilities of the judicial process. See Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1680-81 (1974). In addition, the efficiency argument often neglects to
account for the transaction costs inherent in the resolution of disputes.
31. See R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 105-06.
32. See Louderback & Jurika, supra note 21, at 200-01. Actions for tortious breach
originated in the insurance context. See supra text accompanying note 15. The features of
insurance contracts, including its adhesionary aspects, the imbalance between the parties, the
standardized terms unique to the industry, the insured's motivation for entering into the contract, and the nature of the service for which the contract provides render insurance contracts
"particularly susceptible to public policy considerations." Louderback & Jurika, supra note 21,
at 201.
33. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
34. The notion of the implied covenant imputing a heightened standard of care to certain
contracts apparently was first expressed in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty, 210 N.Y. 235, 24042, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914), which expressly relied on the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to provide a remedy for a dispute over attorneys' fees and costs. The Brassil court
did not recognize a new tort cause of action, but dealt with the claim as a breach of contract
case. Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624.
In later insurance abuse cases, plaintiffs asserted tort actions based upon theories of fraud,
see, e.g., Tiger River Pine v. Maryland Casualty, 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491 (1931) (fraud and
fiduciary duty); Wisconsin Zinc v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 53, 155 N.W. 1081,
1087 (1916) (same); cf Cleveland Wire Spring v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 6 Ohio App. 344, 348 (1917) (considering a cause of action for bad faith viable); or
theories of negligence, see, e.g.. Attleboro Mfg. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass
Ins., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); Attleboro Mfg. Co v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate
Glass Ins., 171 F. 495 (C.C. Mass. 1909): Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 81 N.H.
371, 374, 127 A. 708, 711 (1924); Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 79 N.H. 186, 106 A. 604 (1919); G.A. Stowers Furniture v. American Indem., 15
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Ct. App. 1929).
The standards commonly applied to the insurer's duties to the insured generally followed
two lines, either negligence or bad faith. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 19, §§ 2:04-2:05 (1984)
(collecting cases).
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ognizing these actions in other contexts. 35 Many jurisdictions have relied
on California cases when shaping their own decisions in this area of the
law.

36

37
In the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance,
the defendant insurer was held liable for contract damages, yet the court
noted that "wrongful refusal [to settle] has generally been treated as a
tort. '3 8 A later case, Crisci v. Security Insurance,39 relied on this dictum
to justify a tort remedy for mental suffering caused by an insurer's
4°
wrongful refusal to settle a third-party claim against the insured.
Crisciwas significant because it applied tort damages 41 to a contract
action. Furthermore, the Crisci court distinguished insurance contracts,
where insureds seek "peace of mind and security," from ordinary commercial contracts, where the parties seek "commercial advantage." 42
This distinction subsequently formed the basis of the "special relationship" concept 4 3 that courts have used to extend tort liability for breach of
44
the implied covenant beyond the insurance context.
This shift in focus to the nature of the relationship between the parties allowed the court to reason that the duty of good faith and fair dealing was not found in the express or implied consent of the parties, but

35. Id. § 2:16.
36. Id.
37. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
38. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203 (dictum) (citing Keeton, LiabilityInsuranceand Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1138 (1954) (suggesting that insurers' breach of
contractual duties was treated as a tort; no rationale for tort liability was discussed in the
article, nor was any rationale offered by the court in its decision)).
39. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
40. The Crisci court acknowledged that Comunale had applied contract damages, but
distinguished the two cases noting the nonfeasance of the insurer in Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at
659, 328 P.2d at 200 (i.e., refusal to settle or defend amounting to denial of coverage) and the
misfeasance in Crisci. "[Tihe tort duty is ordinarily based on the insurer's assumption of the
defense and of settlement negotiations ....
Crisci,66 Cal. 2d at 432 n.3, 426 P.2d at 178 n.3,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 18 n.3 (citations omitted); see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
41. Mental distress damages, normally unavailable in contract actions, were allowed pursuant to CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (West 1979). Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 432-34, 426 P.2d at 179,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
42. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The court's reasoning is flawed
because many insurance contracts, especially those with corporate insureds, are entered into
for purely economic reasons. See Note, The Expectation of Peace ofMind: A Basisfor Recovery of Damagesfor Mental Suffering Resultingfrom the Breach of First PartyInsurance Contracts, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1361 (1983).
43. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 620 P.2d 141, 169, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 695-96 (1979).
44. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69 & n.6, 686
P.2d 1158, 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 & n.6 (1984). See Comment, supra note 21, at
1294.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

rather was implied in law in every contract. 45 This rationale imposed on
46
the parties affirmative legal duties, whose breach is tortious.
The California Supreme Court subsequently upheld the award of
punitive damages for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant, on
proof of malicious intent beyond bad faith. 47 While the court based its
application of tort remedies on the nature of the parties' relationship, it
nonetheless required "something more" than mere negligence or breach
to impose punitive damages. Thus, in assessing damages, it held breach
48
of the implied covenant to the same standard as any tort.
The court's use of the "special relationship" to justify tort damages
signalled an important shift in the rationale underlying traditional contract damages. 49 Courts have since used the insurance case "special relationship" analysis to extend tort actions for breach of the implied
covenant to non-insurance contracts. 50 Several courts have extended tort
actions to employment contracts 5' because employment contracts display
45. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480,
485 (1973); Silberg v. California Life Ins., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1109, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 717.
46. The insurer must consider the interest of the insured to be equal to its own.
Comunale v. Traders & General Ins., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201. The standard
governing insurer's consideration of the insured's interests is "whether a prudent insurer
would have accepted the settlement offer if it alone were to be liable for the entire judgment."
Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 818, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695; see also Austero v. National
Casualty, 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 673 (1978) (by rejecting plaintiff's argument of strict liability for an erroneous decision regarding payment of disability benefits the
court reaffirmed the reasonableness standard).
If the insurer fails to meet this standard, it is subject to tort liability. Gruenberg,9 Cal. 3d
at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
47. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 582 P.2d 980, 986 (1978). The court
distinguished the bad faith relevant to liability for compensatory damages from the "oppression, fraud or malice" required by Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West 1979) precedent to the award
of punitive damages.
48. W. KEETON, supra note 22, § 92; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. The court has used the implied covenant to justify the enforcement of specific, affirmative duties beyond the scope of the insurance contract. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 620 P.2d at
146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (duty to investigate claims); Silberg, II Cal. 3d at 461-62, 521 P.2d
at 1111, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717 (duty to construe ambiguity in policy in manner that avoids
severe detriment to the insured); Spindle v. Travelers Ins., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 959, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 404, 408 (1977) (duty to cancel policy only for justifiable reasons).
50. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69 & n.6, 686
P.2d 1158, 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 & n.6 (1984) (dictum); Commercial Cotton v.
United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985); Wallis v. Superior
Court (Kroehler Mfg. Co.), 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984); see also Dunfee
v. Baskin Robbins, 720 P.2d 1148 (Mont. 1986) (franchisees alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of implied convenant).
51. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 609 F. Supp. 467, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1985) aff'd in
part and vacated in part, No. 85-2176, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1987); cf Wallis, 160 Cal. App.
3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (although dealing with a contract between an employer and its
employee, Wallis is not a wrongful termination case).
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that make the insurance contract relationship
the same 5characteristics
"special." 2
B. The Wrongful Termination Cases
In Cleary v. American Airlines,5 3 the first employment case based on
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff
sued his former employer for wrongful discharge after he was terminated
for "theft, leaving his work area... without authorization and threatening a fellow employee with bodily harm."' 54 Acknowledging the existence of the implied covenant in the employment contract, the Cleary
court identified two factors that justify a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant. First, the covenant operated as a function of Cleary's
"longevity of service"; certain "benefits of the employment bargain...
accrued during plaintiff's 18 years of employment.155 Second, the employer had an "expressed policy . . .recogniz[ing] its responsibility to
engage in good faith rather than in arbitrary conduct with respect to all
of its employees."'5 6 The court explained that the employee had the burden of proving the termination was unjust, and the employer had the
"opportunity to demonstrate that it did in fact exercise good faith and
57
fair dealing" when it fired the plaintiff.
Although consistent with the insurance cases, the court's precise
reasoning linking longevity of service to the implied covenant is unclear.
It is unlikely that the court meant to apply the implied covenant only to
employees exhibiting longevity of service, since it suggested that the duty
created by the covenant existed in every contract.5 8 Subsequent cases
52. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769 n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.6
(dictum); Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1116 n.2, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.2; Gates v. Life of
Montana, 205 Mont. 304, 304, 668 P.2d 213, 214 (1983).
One California court has denied the assertion of a tort cause of action because the "special
relationship" element was lacking. Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 890, 893, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 394, 403 (1984); see Louderback & Jurika, supra note 21, at 220-27; Comment, supra
note 21, at 1298-1301.
53. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
54. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
55. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis added). The court held that
"[tiermination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied covenant." Id. In a subsequent case, the California Supreme Court defined "just cause"
to be "a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith in the part of the party
exercising the power." Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
928 (1981) (citation omitted).
56. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis added). This language is reminiscent of Comunale, in which the court found that insurer had violated an express policy obligation. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958).
57. Cleary, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
58. In its general remarks, the court endorsed the "unconditional and independent" duty
created by the implied covenant in "every contract." Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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suggest that the Cleary court's emphasis on longevity was simply one
way a court could determine whether the "special relationship" existed
59
to justify the action for tortious breach of the implied covenant.
Since Cleary, a number of cases have held for the employee on
grounds of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 60 These
cases differ as to the specific criteria to be applied 6' and the basis for
liability. 62 At the same time, there are strong indications that the cause
of action is based primarily on the "special relationship" concept. Several courts have used the "special relationship" criteria to extend and
limit tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant in the employment
contract. 63 Amidst commentators' support 64 and criticism 65 California
59. Several courts have since concluded that lengthy satisfactory service, although "extremely helpful" to an employee seeking to state a cause of action for employer's breach of the
implied covenant, is "not essential to the cause of action." Gray v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App.
3d 813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573-74 (1986) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors,
152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984)); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv.,
150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1137, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363-64 (1983). But see Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, 712 P.2d 891 (1986) (longevity of
employment is necessary for an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); Morriss v. Coleman, 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) (court declined to apply the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment-at-will contracts); Hillesland v.
Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987) (court declined to apply the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts with no term of duration of
employment).
60. See supra note 10.
61. Rulon-Miller v. IBM., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 249. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1984)
(express company policy); Wallis v. Superior Court (Kroehler Mfg. Co.), 160 Cal. App. 3d
1109, 1120, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) (special relationship); Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at
456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (longevity).
62. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986) (bad
faith denial of contract); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977) (public policy reasons).
63. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1986); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 609 F. Supp. 467, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 852176, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1987); Clutterham v. Coachmen Indus., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1223,
1228, 215 Cal. Rptr. 795, 797 (1985); Gomez v. Volkswagen of Am., 169 Cal. App. 3d 921,
928, 215 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1985); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 263,
215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1985); Gianelli Distrib. Co. v. Beck & Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020,
1036, 219 Cal. Rptr. 203, 209 (1985); Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1. 21, 215
Cal. Rptr. 59, 70-71 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 248, 208 Cal. Rptr.
524, 529 (1984).
64. See Louderback & Jurika, supra note 21, at 189 (when the Wallis criteria are present,
"public policy considerations, the foundation for tort action, become operative and the tort of
bad faith breach of contract should be recognized"); Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of
Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REV. 1161. 117784 (1985) (identifying the "three distinguishing characteristics of the insurance context" justifying tort remedies as "the quasi-public-service nature of the insurance industry, the use of
adhesion contracts resulting from the disproportionate bargaining power of the insurer over
the insured, and the fiduciary quality of the insurer's relationship with the insured." (footnotes
omitted)); Comment, The Covenant of Good FaithDealing: A Common Groundfor the Torts of
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courts have freely extended the66 insurance "special relationship" model to
the employment relationship.
C. The Special Relationship Model
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,6 7 the California Supreme Court
cited the California insurance cases and suggested the possibility of a
similar implied covenant action in the employment context. 68 In a nonemployment case, 69 the court later noted that the availability of a tort

action for breach of the implied covenant in insurance cases has depended on the "special relationship between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary
reponsibility . . . . [O]ther relationships
with similar characteristics
'70
deserv[e] similar legal treatment.
Wrongful Discharge From Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1111, 1143-48 (1981)
[hereinafter Comment, The Covenant of Good FaithDealing] (noting that while the insurance
and employment relationships are not identical, "[m]any of the factors that led the courts to
impose duties on insurers are also present in the employment relationship.").
65. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1299-1301 (link between "special relationships" and
tort liability is "analytically questionable"; because the purpose of tort damages is to punish
socially unreasonable conduct, recovery of tort damages should therefore focus on conduct,
rather than the nature of the relationship); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153, 165-67 (1981) ("factors justifying the public policy tort approach in the insurance company cases either do not exist in the employment relationship or
appear there in weaker form").
66. Virtually all of the wrongful termination decisions applying a tort cause of action to
breach of the implied covenant either expressly state the Wallis criteria or cite the same insurance cases as a basis for its application. See, e.g., Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d
813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250,
262 n.2, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 866 n.2 (1985).
67. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). Tameny was decided on the
basis of California's wrongful discharge doctrine, which assures that an employee's refusal to
violate the law in opposition to company orders will not result in discharge. Id. at 178, 610
P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The court based its ruling on the "public policy considerations" expressed in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (employer's authority to discharge for refusal to commit perjury
limited by concern for public interest in general compliance with penal system), and thus
found it "unnecessary" to address the implied covenant issue. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 180 n.12,
610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
68. Id.
69. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Before allowing plaintiff to develop a marina in Eureka, California, the
city required it to secure a dealership for marine fuel. Seaman's negotiated with Standard Oil
and obtained a letter of intent from Standard to that effect. Standard repudiated the letter, for
which Seaman's sued for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and breach of the implied covenant. Although the majority discussed extensively the
implied covenant, it instead created the tort of "bad faith denial" of contract and approved the
award of tort damages. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
70. Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court noted that the
employment relationship has "some of the same characteristics as the relationship between
insurer and insured." Id. at 769 n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.6.
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An appellate court applied the "special relationship" model in Wal-

lis v. Superior Court,7' extending the tort of breach of the implied cove72
nant to a contract between an employer and its former employee.

Although the Wallis contract was not an employment contract, it was a
contract entered into between an employer and its employee in the context of the employment relationship. In Wallis, the employer promised

to pay a monthly stipend to its former employee for ten years, during
which time the employee's accrued pension benefits would remain un-

available. In exchange for these payments, the employee agreed not to
compete with his former employer's business. The employee received
payments according to the contract for almost three years, until the employer unilaterally terminated what it referred to as "gratuitous payments."'7 3 The court, in an extensive analysis, determined that the
characteristics of the insurance contract that give rise to a tort action are
"also present in most employer-employee relationships. '74
The court noted that the features that justify tort remedies and dis-

tinguish insurance contracts from ordinary commercial contracts are
"characteristics with public policy implications,

motivation for entering into the

contract, 76

'7 5

including a non-profit

disparity in bargaining

power, 77 and the inadequacy with which contract damages promote pol78
icy concerns.

These features create the "special relationship between the parties
which requires a heightened duty on the part of the insurer not to breach
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contract, as well
as a heightened expectation by the insured that his or her contract will
not be breached." 79 This "heightened expectation" derives from the duty
described in earlier cases requiring an insurer to consider the insured's
interest as equal to its own. 80 Using these concepts as a basis for analy-

sis, the Wallis court identified five factors that must be present in a con71. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
72. Id. at 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
73. Id. at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
74. Id. at 1116 n.2, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.2.
75. Id. at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins.. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434,
426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967) (insureds expect "peace of mind" when
purchasing insurance)).
76. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19; Wallis, 160 Cal. App.
3d at 1117-18, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
77. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117-18, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (noting that the normal
protections provided by the open market are not available in the insurance context).
78. Id. (contract damages provide no incentive to the insurer not to breach; if liable only
for the contract limits, insurer will find it economically advantageous to withhold payment and
earn interest during which time the insured is forced to accept a settlement below policy
limits).
79. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
80. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Bird developed the
same line of reasoning in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
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tract to "predicate" tort liability: (1) the contracting parties' bargaining
positions must be inherently unequal; (2) one party must be motivated by

"non-profit" concerns such as security or peace of mind; (3) contract

damages must be inadequate because they do not create accountability of
the superior party and they do not make the inferior party "whole"; (4)
one party must be particularly vulnerable because of the type of harm it

could suffer and because it must trust the other party to perform; and (5)
the stronger party must be aware of this vulnerability. 8 1 The existence of
these factors creates a "heightened duty" on the part of the stronger
party "not to act unreasonably in breaching the contract, and to consider
the interest of the [weaker] party as tantamount to its own."' 82
Once a court determines that a "special relationship" exists, it may
impute a higher standard of conduct to the "superior" party, consistent
with the expectations of the "inferior" party.83 Whatever affirmative duties 84 are created in the context of the particular
relationship at issue
85
depends on the nature of that relationship.
An employee may stand in a "special relationship" to his employer
and, thus, faces a "heightened duty" not to "act unreasonably" and to
consider the employer's interest as tantamount to his own. 86 In determining when such a duty might exist, it is instructive to consider the
common-law duties traditionally imputed to the employee.

776-82, 686 P.2d 1158, 1170-77, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 368-71 (Bird, C.J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
81. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
82. Id. The court applied the facts of the case to the test it developed, and determined
that the employer had a duty not to act unreasonably in discontinuing contract payments, and
was therefore subject to tort liability.
83. The characteristics of the "special" employment relationship "undoubtedly help
shape the justified expectations of the contracting parties, and therefore, help determine the
nature and extent of the duty of good faith between them." Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 777, 686
P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Bird, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(citation omitted).
84. Conduct deemed to tortiously breach the implied covenant includes termination
without just cause, Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 457, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980); termination for bringing suit against the employer, Khanna v. Microdata, 170
Cal. App. 3d 250, 265, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 868 (1985); and application of company policy in a
discriminatory or arbitrary fashion, Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 248, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524, 529 (1984).
85. Id.; Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118-20, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. ContraKhanna,
170 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (requiring bad faith denial of contract); Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984)
(requiring "bad faith action extraneous to the contract, combined with obligor's intent to frustrate obligee's enjoyment of contract rights"); Crozier v. United Parcel Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d
1132, 1138, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1983) (endorsing Cleary's longevity requirement).
86. Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
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Employees' Common-Law Good Faith Duties

In addition to the duties expressly imposed on or undertaken by the
employee in the employment contract, the law implies various obligations on him. These implied duties include: exercise of competence and
88
87
care in the performance of his duties, obedience to reasonable rules,
decent conduct, 89 loyalty while in the employer's service, 90 and treatment
of the employer with respect. 9 1 These duties are implied absent an express contract. Further, during the tenure of his employment, equity prevents an employee from using his employer's trade secrets and
confidential information for his own benefit or for the benefit of someone
92 and may prevent him from competing with his
other than his employer,
93
former employer.
Compared to an employee, an agent's duties represent a higher standard of conduct. 94 An agent's implied duties include: good faith and
87. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 108 (1970) and cases cited therein. In
addition, the employee is bound to indemnify the employer for damages resulting from failure
to perform the duty that he owes to the employer. American S. Ins. v. Dime Taxi Serv., 275
Ala. 51, 55, 151 So. 2d 783, 785 (1963); Gadsen v. George H. Crafts & Co., 175 N.C. 358, 363,
95 S.E. 610, 612 (1918).
88. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 98 (1970) and cases cited therein. Failure to
follow the employer-principal's instructions will render the employee-agent liable for any damages caused by the employee's actions beyond the scope of the principal-employer's instructions. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency §§ 206-44 (1986).
89. Lyon v. Pollard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 403, 406 (1874); Murmanill Corp. v. Simkins, 251
F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1958); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 850
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944, reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 965 (1955).
90. Coker v. Wesco Materials Corp., 368 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963); Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1963); United Bd. & Carton
Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517, 522, 164 A.2d 824, 828 (1959), modified on other
grounds, 61 N.J. Super. 340, 160 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 33 N.J. 326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960).
91. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946).
92. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1934); see also Robison, The Confidence Game: An
Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 374 (1983) (discussing the
extent of an employee's duty not to disclose or use trade secrets); Note, A Balanced Approach
to Employer-Employee Trade Secret Disputes in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 673 (1980)
(discussing contractual agreements in which the employee agrees not to disclose or use the
employer's trade secrets).
93. Competition with one's former employer is barred at common law when the former
employee competes in a fraudulent manner, violates an enforceable anticompetitive covenant,
or misappropriates trade secrets. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies §§ 542-64 (1971) (Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices).
94. The distinctions between agent and employee, and between principal and employer
are important in determining the rights and duties correspondent to the respective party's
status. Dean v. Ketter, 328 Ill. App. 206, 211, 65 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1946) (distinguishing
between an independent contractor and an ordinary employee); Anderson v. St. Paul, 226
Minn. 186, 196, 32 N.W.2d 538, 544 (1948) (distinguishing between an ordinary employee,
such as a waitress, and a managing agent).
An employee can be an agent with respect to some elements of his job, and a servant with
respect to others, Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 190, 31 So. 2d 268, 270-71 (1947); Kourik v.
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loyalty, 95 adherence to instructions, 96 exercise of reasonable care in the
performance of her obligations, 97 and accountability for all funds and
property belonging to the principal. 98 General duties implied in law require the agent to conduct herself with propriety. 99 If the agent's services include personal relations with her principal, she has a duty to act so
that continued friendly relations with her principal are not rendered
impossible.' 00
Because of the authority vested in the agent by her principal, the
agency relationship demands trust and confidence. 10 ' This "special relationship" creates quasi-fiduciary duties on the part of the agent. 102 When
the agency relationship is one of employment, courts have found that the
fiduciary duty requires that "neither party shall do anything which will

the right of the other party to
have the effect of destroying or injuring
10 3
receive the fruits of the contract."'

English, 340 Mo. 367, 377, 100 S.W.2d 901, 905 (1936), depending on the nature of the performance required by the contract. A principal distinction between the functions of agent and
employee is that of authority. The agent is authorized to enter into legal relations with third
parties; an employee has no such authority, but renders services that are purely mechanical at
the direction of his employer. Dimos v. Stowe, 193 Va. 831, 839, 71 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1952).
95. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
96. Appleby v. Kewanee Oil, 279 F.2d 334, 336 (10th Cir. 1960) (right of principal to
give lawful directions that agent is under duty to obey).
97. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 297 (1973).
98. United States v. Rose, 346 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Aetna
Ins. v. United States, 382 U.S. 979 (1966); Brooke v. Quigley, 33 Cal. App. 484, 491, 165 P.
731, 734 (1917).
99. United Radio v. Cotton, 61 Ohio App. 247, 252, 22 N.E.2d 532, 534 (1938); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 (1958) (duty of good conduct).
100. Meyers v. American Well Works, 114 F.2d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 1940) (plaintiff's contract to act as defendant's exclusive sales agent subject to the implied condition that employee's conduct towards his employer shall minimally be free of "insolence, disrespect, and
insubordination"), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 563 (1941).
101. By extending its authority to the employee, the employer necessarily places itself in a
position of trust. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. This element of necessity and
trust is one of the elements referred to by the courts as a "predicate to tort liability" for
insurers and employers. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr.
123, 129 (1984).
102. While not lending itself to precise definition, the fiduciary relationship operationally
prohibits the stronger party from abusing its power when it seeks to promote its own interests
at the expense of the weaker party. See First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 262,
681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984).
Commentators have criticized this expression. See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 229 n. 119
("Phrases such as fiduciary relationship, relationship of trust, and confidential relationship are
used interchangeably by the courts; the definition of these terms is also vague, haphazard, and
fragmentary." (citation omitted)); Comment, The Covenant of Good FaithDealing,supra note
64, at 1147-48 ("fiduciary" expresses the conclusion that the law will protect the weaker party
by imposing a standard of care higher than the usual duty of good faith requires).
103. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947) (quoting Kirke La
Shelle v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933)); Van Valkenburgh,
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The trust element of good faith duties is associated with the very
meaning of fiduciary. 0 4 The fiduciary relationship exists when "the parties are so circumstanced or associated in a business transaction that one
10 5
party must rely on the good faith and integrity of the other."'
A review of the "disloyalty" and "trade secrets" cases illustrates the
"good faith" quality of common-law duties traditionally imputed to certain employees and makes clear that the idea of employees assuming
heightened responsibilities in "special relationship" situations is by no
means a new or revolutionary concept. Just as the "special relationship"
heightens the expectations of insureds and employees in the context of
their respective relationships, an employer's expectations are heightened
when an employee assumes duties with fiduciary qualities. In such situations, the employee is traditionally held to a higher standard of conduct' 0 6 than employees without quasi-fiduciary duties.
A.

Duty of Good Faith and Loyalty

The duty of good faith and loyalty requires the agent-employee to
0 7
act for the furtherance and advancement of his employer's interests.'
Most often this means that the employee will not compete with his emNooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 281 N.E.2d 142, 144, 330
N.Y.S.2d 329, 333, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972).
Noting that this is the precise definition of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing found in every contract, one commentator concluded that the term "fiduciary" says
nothing about the characteristics leading the court to impose the good faith duties that flow
from it. Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith Dealing, supra note 64, at 1147.
104. Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 n.17 (1983).

105. Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 372, 305 P.2d 669, 678 (1956). The Wallis
court considered the same "vulnerability" factor to be a "predicate" for tort liability in an
implied covenant breach. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
106. The difference between an agent's duties and an employee's duties is illustrated by the
difference in initiative required by the law. An agent must take the initiative to act. British
Gen. Ins. v. Simpsin Sales, 265 Ala. 683, 688, 93 So. 2d 763, 767 (1957) (insurance agent liable
for failure to inform insured that agent was unable to write policies to cover different home);
D'Acquisto v. Evola, 90 Cal. App. 2d 210, 214, 202 P.2d 596, 598 (1949) (broker not liable for
failure to ascertain grade and size of fish purchased for principal, although duty to ascertain
grade generally would create liability); Render & Hammett v. Hartford Fire Ins., 33 Ga. App.
716, 719, 127 S.E. 902, 903 (1925) (agent liable for failure to notify principal of substitute
notice served upon agency in lieu of service on principal).
These duties stand in contrast to the employee's duty simply to follow directions. See
generally 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant §§ 97-98 (1970) (employee's duty to employer).
107. United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d 109, 112 (1st Cir. 1964) (poultry inspector, as
agent of U.S. government, can breach fiduciary duties by engaging in independent consulting
contracts); Knudsen v. Torrington Co., 254 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1958) (partnership as sales
agency); Valley Nat'l Bank v. Milmoe, 74 Ariz. 290, 297, 248 P.2d 740, 744 (1952) (bank as
agent for mortgagee); Collins v. Heitman, 225 Ark. 666, 671, 284 S.W.2d 628, 633 (1955)
(auctioneer as agent for both buyer and seller); McKinney v. Christmas, 143 Colo. 361, 363,
353 P.2d 373, 374 (1960) (real estate broker as agent for landowners); Blanchard v. Lewis, 414
Il1. 515, 522, 112 N.E.2d 167, 172 (1953) (securities brokers as agents for bondowner).
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ployer.108 The duty of loyalty also has forbidden reduction in productivity, 0 9 contravention of employer's orders, 10 or misappropriation of
"some special knowledge" gained from employment."'
Employer's remedies for employee's breach of the duty of loyalty
include compensatory damages,"12 and occasionally punitive damages.' 13
The principal reason for awarding compensatory damages is to reimburse the employer for provable losses caused by the employee's breach
of loyalty. 114 Courts have awarded punitive damages where the
circum' 1' 5 Most
stances demonstrate "tort elements and abuse of confidence."
16
breach of loyalty cases, however, seek injunctive relief."
108. Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 188, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245 (1954); Goal
Systems Int'l v. Klouda, No. 84AP-168, (Ohio App. Oct. 10, 1985) ("an employee is ...in
breach of his duty of loyalty if he competes with his employer").
109. Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 570 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (on employer's proof that employees "decreased the work they did for" employer while engaging in
activities extraneous to their employment contracts, employees found in breach of their "duties
of good faith and fair dealing") (citing Duane Jones, 306 N.Y. at 189, 117 N.E.2d at 245; Elco
Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 104, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (1932) (rejecting salesman's defense
that cheaper line of shoes did not technically "compete" with plaintiff's "higher-end" product,
court focused on principal's expectation that all of its salesmen's efforts be directed towards
sale of its products).
110. Breen v. Larson College, 137 Conn. 152 (1950). The dean of a private college was
discharged for unilaterally inviting local police on campus to investigate a student-reported
rape, in direct contravention of his employer's instructions. Rejecting plaintiff's plea for reinstatement, the Breen court found that his breach of the duty of good faith and loyalty was
"sufficient basis.., to justify [the lower court's] conclusion that he had breached the contract
[and that] employer's action terminating [employment] ...was valid." Id. at 157.
In Breen, the grounds for breach of the duty of loyalty were the employer's belief that the
publicity following the police investigation was detrimental to the college's interests. Id. at 156.
The court made no attempt to evaluate the merits of the president's decision and simply held
that breach of the implied condition of loyalty was a breach of contract, and excused the
employer from performing its contract duties.
I11. Westwood, 570 F. Supp. at 1040.
112. Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1060
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
113. Id. at 1060. The court awarded punitive damages in the amount of $1,500 to a former employer for its former employee's breach of the duty of loyalty, in the absence of a
showing of actual damages resulting from the breach. Noting the departure from normal contract damages rules, the court justified its award of punitive damages by emphasizing the "tort
elements and abuse of confidence-the disloyalty of employees." The breach of loyalty in this
case consisted of defendants, former employees of plaintiff, soliciting current employees to
leave plaintiff while in its employ. Id.; see also Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 192,
117 N.E.2d 237, 247 (1954) (amount of damages could not be estimated with certainty).
114. Compensatory damages include reimbursement of wages paid during period of employment when employee was being disloyal, and the cost of training employees that replaced
those "hired away" by former employee. Chusid, 326 F. Supp. at 1061 (citing Harry R. Defier
Corp. v. Kleeman, 19 A.D.2d 396, 404, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930, 938 (1963), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 694,
278 N.Y.S.2d 883, 225 N.E.2d 569 (1967)).
115. Id. at 1060 (citing 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 439-46 (1964)).
116. Universal Elec. v. Golden Shield Corp., 316 F.2d 568, 573 (Ist Cir. 1963) (citing
Midland-Ross v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 1961)); Breen v. Larson College, 137
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Some courts have broadly stated that an "act contrary to the em17
ployer's interests" is a breach of the duty of good faith and loyalty."
This language is strikingly similar to language used to define the implied
covenant. " 8 This similarity suggests that the same kind of "special relationship" considerations that prompted courts to impose the duty of
good faith and fair dealing on insurance companies and employers have
historically been used by courts to impose liability on employees for
breach of the duty of good faith and loyalty.
Elements similar to those found in an employer's breach of the implied covenant are also found in an employee's breach of the duty of
loyalty. These include the employee's duty to consider the employer's
interest equally to his own, 1 9 the special trust elements that create
heightened duties, 12 0 and the employer's heightened expectations in the
2
employee's standard of conduct.' '

B. Non-Disclosure of Trade Secrets
A duty closely related to loyalty is that of nondisclosure of trade
secrets or confidential information. An employee is considered a fiduciConn. 152, 157 (1950); Auxton Computer Enter., Inc. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 425, 416
A.2d 952, 956 (1980); Elco Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 105, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (1932);
see Note, Tort Remedy for Bad Faith Breaches of IntracorporateFiduciaryDuty, 16 PAc. L.J.
853, 854 (1985).
117. Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 1961) (At common law
the employee owes a duty of loyalty to his employer. "He must not, while employed, act
contrary to the employer's interests and, in general terms, owes a duty of loyalty as on of the
incidents of the employer-employee relationship."); accord Universal Elec. v. Golden Shield
Corp., 316 F.2d 568, 573 (1st Cir. 1963).
This expansive reading of the duty of loyalty illustrates the imbalance in bargaining power
that the tort action of employer's breach of the implied covenant is perhaps intended to equalize. See Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprisein the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247 (1967); Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California

Supreme Court, 20 UCLA L. REV. 5 (1972).
118. Universal Elec. v. Golden Shield Corp., 316 F.2d 568, 573 (1st Cir. 1963) (citing
Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 1961)); Breen v. Larson College,
137 Conn. 152, 157 (1950) (violation of trust equated with breach of the "implied condition
that the [employee] . . . will do nothing injurious to his employer's interest."); Auxton Computer Enter. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 425, 416 A.2d 952, 956 (1980) ("employee owes a
duty of loyalty to the employer, and ... must not, while employed, act contrary to employer's
interests."); cf Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200
(1958) (all contracts contain implied covenant that neither party will do anything that injures
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement); Brown v. Superior Court, 34
Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (same).
119. Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115, 133 (E.D. Va. 1971).
120. Interference with at-will employment relationships, while normally not actionable, is
"actionable... when ... there is a relation of confidence." Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1060 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (citing A.S. Rampell, Inc. v.
Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475, 144 N.E.2d 371 (1957)).
121. Elco Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 101, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (1932).
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ary with respect to the information that comes to him in the course of his
employment. 122 This relationship requires him to exercise the utmost
good faith, loyalty, and honesty to his employer. 123 Thus, when an employee works with trade secrets, he must exercise a standard of conduct
higher than that of employees who never work with trade secrets. 124
Even in the absence of express contractual provisions,1 25 when an
employee holds a position of trust1 26 a number of courts have implied the
duty to protect confidential information. This position of trust exists
whenever an employee is entrusted with confidential information. 127
Firms using sensitive information in their operations often must disclose
it to their employees so that employees can perform their jobs.128 This
122. See Community Counselling Serv. Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1963);
Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115, 132 (E.D. Va. 1971).
123. Logetronics, 323 F. Supp. at 132.
124. The court used the trade secrets doctrine to justify its application of tort liability and
the higher standard of conduct required in fiduciary relationships. Logetronics, 323 F. Supp. at
132-33.
125. In many cases today involving the improper use of trade secrets, the employee has
explicitly agreed not to use or disclose confidential information for a certain period of time.
See, eg., Rollins Protective Serv. Co. v. Palermo, 249 Ga. 138, 140-42, 287 S.E.2d 546, 549-51
(1982) (contract prohibiting employee from disclosing methods and systems of alarm systems
for two years).
The increased use of interrorem, or noncompetition clauses in employment contracts is
evidenced by the increase in recent years of the number of claims based upon violation of these
agreements. A Lexis search conducted on 11/24/86 retrieved 78 cases based on actions for
violation of noncompetition clauses, the oldest of which dated 1970. See generallyAnnotation,
Conflict ofLaws as to Validity, Enforceability, and Effect ofAncillary Restrictive Covenant Not
to Compete, in Contract of Employment orfor Sale of Business, 70 A.L.R. 2 D 1292 (1960).
126. See, e.g., Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973);
Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc.,
166 F. Supp. 250, 260 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960); see also
Durham v. Stand-By Labor, Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 563, 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1973) ("general
confidential business and customer information ... is fully protectable in the absence of contract if procured by improper means or otherwise disclosed without privilege, as in violation of
relationships of confidence").
127. Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115, 132 (E.D. Va. 1971) (employee is fiduciary with respect to information obtained during employment); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164 (1958) (employee holds confidential information in
trust for the employer and cannot use it in violation of his trust); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145
Conn. 509, 515, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958) (employee's receipt of information by employer's
confidence requires employee not to "fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in him"); Lincoln
App. 3d 353, 358-59, 425 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (1981)
Towers Ins. Agency v. Farrell, 99 Ill.
(employee breaches confidential relationship with employer when he "surreptitiously copies or
memorizes" trade secrets with the intent to harm the employer); Koch Eng'g Co., Inc. v.
Faulconer, 227 Kan. 813, 826, 610 P.2d 1094, 1105 (1980) (confidential relationship exists
when employer entrusts trade secrets information to employee); David Fox & Sons, Inc. v.
King Poultry Co., 262 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987-88 (1964) (when employer entrusts confidential information to "trusted employee," employee cannot use that information to his own ends).
128. "[M]odern economic growth has pushed the business venture beyond the size of the
[small] firm, forcing the [employer] to a much greater degree to entrust confidential business
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forced disclosure creates risks for the employer, increasing
the relative
"strength," or bargaining position, of the employee. 29
Although many trade secret cases focus on the employer's threshold
30
burden of proving that the information in question is a trade secret,
the cases occasionally intermingle concepts of trade secret with concepts
of the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. 131 Duties of trade secret
and loyalty are infused with the same "special relationship" factors of
longevity of service, trust, and confidentiality 32 that underlie the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The "loyalty" and "trade secrets" cases strongly suggest that extension of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing duties, at least to employees occupying positions of special trust and confidence, would be
consistent with both precedent and current case law. Both tort actions
are concerned with employee conduct in abuse of a "special relationship"
information ... to appropriate employees." Gilburne & Johnson, Computer Software Protection Available in Trade Secrets Law, Legal Times, Nov. 22, 1982, at 20, col. 4.
129. Note, Balancing Employers' Trade Secret Interests in High-Technology Products
Against Employees' Rights and Public Interests in Minnesota, 69 MINN. L. REV. 984, 991
(1985).
The necessary disclosure of confidential information prompted creation of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 541-51 (1980). Nine states have
adopted the model act. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-1001 to -1007 (Supp. 1983) (effective
Mar. 12, 1981); 1983 Conn. Reg. Acts 344 (effective June 23, 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 2001-2009 (Supp. 1982) (effective Apr. 15, 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (Supp.
1984) (adopted 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (Bums Supp. 1984) (effective
Sept. 1 1982, except as provided in § 24-2-3-8); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (Supp.
1982) (effective July 1, 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West Supp. 1984)
(adopted July 19, 1981); MINN. STAT. §§ 325 C.01-.08 (1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to .940 (West Supp. 1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1982). In addition, North Carolina's Trade Secrets Protection Act borrows from both the model act and the
common law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (Supp. 1981) (effective Oct. 1, 1981).
The Trade Secrets Act is an effort to strike a balance between employers' rights to protect
their property and employees' rights to advance their careers. Note, supra, at 985. Modeled
along the lines of the Restatement test for misappropriation, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(1934), disclosure of trade secrets without privilege to do so imposes liability on the disclosing
party if the secret was discovered by improper means (e.g., industrial espionage) or if disclosure breached a confidential relationship, such as that between principal and agent.
Liability for disclosure under the Act results only from "bad faith conduct, such as...
abuse of confidence .. " Note, supra, at 988 n.18
130. E.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987) (former employer's failure to establish trade secret); Cudahy Co. v. American Labs., Inc., 313 F. Supp.
1339, 1344 (D. Neb. 1970) (failure to prove trade secret).
131. United Bd. & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517, 532-33, 164 A.2d 824, 828
(1959) (employee disloyalty found actionable where employee used employer's customer list to
compete with employer while still employed), cert. denied, 33 N.J. 326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960).
132. One commentator recommended that the threshold criteria to establish constructive
knowledge of trade secret include length of service or position that requires familiarity with an
employer's "policies, goals, products, and marketing strategies." Note, supra note 129, at
1003-04.

January 1988]

EMPLOYEES' GOOD FAITH DUTIES

in which the employer is prevented from realizing its reasonable expectation of benefits from the employment contract. 133 Moreover, the trust or
confidentiality inherent in the relationship makes it "special." 134 The degree of trust determines what duties will be implied in law 13 5 and the
corresponding standard of conduct with which the employee must perform those duties.136
The common law currently imposes the good faith duties of loyalty
and trade secret 37 on employees in much the same way that courts impose the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the employer. The duty of
utmost good faith and loyalty is described in language similar to that
defining the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 38 Under
both theories, duties are imposed on the respective parties, 139 and similar
"special relationship" considerations limit the tort actions available for
breach of these duties."40
In addition, it is also apparent that courts use similar rationales to
justify the common-law employee duties and the employer's duty of good
faith and fair dealing. When the employer's interests are threatened to a
greater degree than the employee's interests, the common law generally
provides equitable relief, '4 ' and occasionally punitive damages,' 42 to prevent the employee from abusing his position of trust. 143 Conversely,
when the employee's interests are paramount, and the employer is in a
significantly greater bargaining position, as in the employment termination context, 144 the employer is held to a higher standard of conduct 145
46
by application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 1
Extension of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing to em133.

Id. at 988 n.18 (requirement of good faith is central to all subparts of RESTATEMENT
§ 757 (1934)); see supra note 129; Robison, supra note 92, at 374-76 (reasonable for
employer to expect that its trade secrets will be respected beyond the tenure of the employment
relationship; reasonable for employee to expect that he will be able to pursue his employment
as he chooses, as long as the trade secrets are not compromised); see also AMP, Inc., 823 F.2d
at 1206 (absent restrictive covenant, court will protect "protectible business interest" on showing of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief).
134. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 94.
136. An employee is imputed the duty of loyalty; an agent is imputed the duty of utmost
good faith and loyalty. The employee's duty extends during the tenure of his employment
relationship; the agent's duties can extend beyond the term of employment. Id.
137. See supra notes 107-31 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 113.
144. See supra note 84.
145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 84, 85 and accompanying text.
OF TORTS
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ployees occupying special positions of trust and confidence thus would
provide a coherent theoretical structure for tortious breach of the implied
covenant consistent with existing case law.

III.
A.

Constructing a Theory of Employees' Implied Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The Insurance Model
In the context of insurance bad faith actions, the law seems to recog-

nize the insured's good faith duties. In California Casualty GeneralInsurance v. Superior Court (Gorgei), 147 an insured sued her insurer for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 148 The appellate court
allowed the insurer to allege an affirmative defense of "comparative bad
faith."' 149 The court reasoned that when contracting to provide insurance, an insurer's reasonable expectations are that its insured will
"promptly and accurately furnish it with all the information and evidence pertinent to the claim that is known to the insured." 150 Basing its
holding on comparative fault principles, 151 the court determined that an
insured's breach of the implied covenant that contributes to her insurer's
failure to perform or delay in performing contract duties may constitute
a partial defense to the insured's damage action for the insurer's breach
152
of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
By making the plaintiff comparatively liable for its bad faith actions,
the court gave meaning to the traditional "two-way street" description of
147. 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985).
148. Plaintiff also alleged breach of insurer's statutory duties under the unfair practices
act, California Insurance Code § 790.03, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
California Casualty Gen. Ins., 173 Cal. App. 3d at 276-77, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
149. Id. at 284, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823. Insured alleged defendants failed to investigate and
process his claim in a reasonable and timely manner, failed to effectuate a fair settlement of the
claim, and failed to pay under an uninsured motorist provision of the policy. The insurer
asserted comparative bad faith, claiming that
plaintiff... [is] guilty of bad faith conduct in the prosecuting, handling and management of the uninsured motorist claim ... and as a proximate cause of [her] bad faith
acts, omissions and failure to provide full and complete information to the defendants ... defendants request that any damages awarded against them for bad faith be
reduced by the amount of the bad faith conduct of plaintiff.
Id. at 277-78, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19
150. Id. at 282, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
151. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(comparative fault applied to negligent conduct); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d
322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978) (comparative fault between two tortfeasors one of
whose liability was based on strict products liability and the other on negligence); Daly v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (comparative fault
applied between strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff).
152. California Casualty Gen. Ins., 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (1985).
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the duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy. 53 The
reciprocal nature of the good faith duties implied in law has been the
subject of several recent insurance cases, 154 all holding that the obligations inherent in the implied covenant rest "as much on the insured as on
155
the insurer."'
Further, several insurance cases suggest that an insured's breach of
the implied covenant will justify tort liability to the insurer. In Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Altfillisch Construction Co., 156 the court held
that the insured had breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by attempting to contract away the insurer's subrogation rights
before any policy losses had occurred. 157 Although Altfillisch resulted in

an equitable award, 158 the court recognized that tort liability for breach
of the implied covenant "devolve[s] alike upon the insured as well as the
insurer."1 59 TheAltfillisch court might be criticized, however, for its failure to discuss the difference, if any, between the good faith duties imputed to an insured and those duties imputed to a subrogor.
Consistent with Altfillisch, a recent California case suggested that an
insurer's failure to prove fraud 160 did not preclude other remedies, including an "independent 'reverse bad faith' action by the insurer against

153. Id. (citing Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,
918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980)).
154. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Moore, 783 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (in dicta,
acknowledging that "the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing places a corresponding duty on the insured"); Johnson v. Southern State Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 235, 236, 332 S.E.2d
778, 779 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (duty of good faith rests as much on the insured as the insured),
rev'd on other grounds, 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986).
155. Id.; see also Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
912, 919, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967)).
156. 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977).
157. Id. at 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 95. The insurer had underwritten an insurance policy on
construction equipment owned and leased by Conexco. Conexco had leased the equipment to
Altfillisch and for consideration agreed to act as Altfillisch's surety in the case of damage to
the equipment. When Altfillisch's employees negligently damaged the equipment, Liberty Mutual paid Conexco for the loss, then pursuant to its policy, proceeded to assert its subrogation
rights against Altfillisch. Id. at 792-94, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93. It was then that Liberty
Mutual learned of Conexco's surety agreement with Altfillisch, which precluded an action on
behalf of Conexco against Altfillisch. Id.
158. The Altfillisch court affirmed the judgment voiding the insurance policy between
Conexco and Liberty and required Conexco to reimburse the funds Liberty had previously
paid under the policy for the loss. Id. at 796, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
159. Id. at 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
160. Orient Handel v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 192 Cal. App. 3d 684, 695, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 667, 673 (1987) (dictum) (seeking to recover its attorney's fees and costs of investigation,
insurer failed to prove that it had actually relied on its insured's misrepresentations when
initiating its investigation).
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its insured" 16' to recover damages. In Orient Handel v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty,162 the insureds had allegedly committed a burglary against their own store in order to recover the loss against its insurance policy. 16 3 Although the court expressly refused to consider a
"reverse bad faith" action because the insurer had not advanced the the164
ory, it implied that the circumstances might support such a claim.
The insurance cases clearly support assertion of the implied covenant against an insured as an affirmative defense 165 and arguably support
an independent action grounded in an implied covenant theory. 166 Since
the courts have extended the insurance bad faith model to the employ167
it is possiment context in suits by employees against their employers,
ble that the courts would support such an extension in a "reverse bad
faith" action.
To reach this result, one must conclude that under certain circumstances 68 the law can theoretically impute duties to the employee under
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The legal propriety of such
an extension, however, still remains in question. The only decision to
address this issue squarely, Hudson v. Moore Business Machines,169 has
suggested that liability for tortious breach of the implied covenant may
run only against the employer, as the "stronger" party to the contract. A
closer examination of Hudson, however, reveals that such a conclusion is
subject to serious question in light of the narrow facts of that case and
the subsequent case law undercutting Hudson's broad rationale.
B.

The Hudson Case

As the only case on record discussing employee's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Hudson v. Moore Business
Forms170 raises a number of interesting questions.
In Hudson, a former employee sued her former employer alleging
alleging several theories, including breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.' 7 1 The defendant counterclaimed, alleging
161. Id. at 696-97, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
162. 192 Cal. App. 3d 684, 237 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1987).
163. Id. at 692-93, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
164. Id. at 697, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
165. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
168. These circumstances are described as "special" or fiduciary relationships. See supra
note 102.
169. 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 85-2176, slip
op. (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1987).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 470.
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violations of various sections of the California Labor Code 17 2 and the
employee's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.173 The essence of the defendant's counterclaim regarding the good faith and loyalty allegations were charges that the former employee had breached
certain "duties imposed by her 'employment relationship' by denying the
existence of a contract in which she allegedly agreed to be terminated in
return for the receipt of severance benefits." 174
Since the employment relationship is "special," 17 5 the court required the party asserting the implied covenant claim to demonstrate the
Wallis elements 176 to justify the extension of tort liability to what was
essentially a breach of contract. 177 The court noted that in Wallis the

superior party (employer) was the breaching party; in Hudson, the

clearly inferior party (employee) 178 allegedly breached the agreement.
The court reasoned that current law allowed only the weaker party to
recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant, and consequently denied the employer any right to tort damages against its former

employee. 179
If, as repeatedly stated by the courts, the implied covenant of good
172.

Id. (defendants alleged violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2854, 2856-59, and 2865

(1937)).
173. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 470.
174. Id. at 477 (Defendants contended that employee's bad faith denial of the termination
agreement fit squarely within the arena created by Seaman's, and quoted the language in Seaman's justifying tort relief when the breaching party denies, "in bad faith and without probable

cause, that the contract exists." (citing Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal. 3d 762, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 354 (1984)).
The court noted that Seaman's bad faith denial tort action is limited to "ordinary commercial contract[s], where the parties are of 'roughly equal bargaining power .... ' " The
Court also observed that earlier it had recognized the availability of tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant in agreements, including employment contracts, characterized by elements of "public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 478
(quoting Seaman's,36 Cal. 3d at 768-69 & n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 &
n.6).
175. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 475 n.2.
176. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
177. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 475 n.2 (plaintiff must satisfy Wallis test as condition precedent to stating a claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant); id. at 478 (defendant must
satisfy Wallis test to state a valid counterclaim for tortious breach of the implied covenant).
178. The court made much of the disparity between defendant, a national corporate concern, and plaintiff, a middle-aged woman whose husband was retired. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at
479.
179. Id. Contra Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 876 (1983) (in the context of express agreements for
assignment of future invention rights to the employer contained in employment contracts,
"[t]he courts seem to ignore the employer's inherently stronger bargaining position and superior legal knowledge." (citing Fish v. Air-O-Fan Prod. Co., 285 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1960));
Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1925); Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App.
150, 155, 507 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1973)).
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faith and fair dealing inheres to both parties to a contract, 180 then the
court's statement that only "the employer

. . .

can be held liable in tort

for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an
employment contract"' 8' is open to question.' 8 2 Insurance bad faith litigation' 83 casts doubt on Hudson's emphasis on the relative financial
strength of the parties and its conclusion that the party with greater financial strength lacks standing to sue for breach of the implied covenant.
These cases suggest that Hudson was clearly wrong to the extent
that it intended a blanket rule against allowing implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claims against employees. While the Hudson court
was probably correct in the result of its decision, 8 4 it interpreted the
Wallis test too narrowly when it concluded that "only ...the employer
...can be held liable in tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and
' 85
fair dealing implied in an employment contract."'
C. The Fiduciary Model
Even if one were to accept Hudson's rationale that only the
"stronger" party may be held liable for breach of the covenant, it may
still be asserted that an employee occupying special positions of trust and
confidence is the "stronger" party. Because of their positions, such employees possess a peculiar ability to damage the interests of their employer. A common characteristic of the relationships that give rise to
tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is the "fiduciary" nature of the relationship. 86 A fiduciary relationship has been described as a relationship in which one party, the "en180. The articulation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "that neither
party will do anything" to deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract impliedly
includes both parties to a contract. For definite statements of the reciprocal nature of the
implied covenant, see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
791 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1986); California Casualty Gen. Ins. v. Superior Ct., 173 Cal.
App. 3d 274, 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (1985); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
Safeway Stores, 26 Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980);
Johnson v. Southern State Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 235, 236, 332 S.E.2d 778, 779 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985), rev'd, 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986).
181. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 479.
182. Applying the concept of "comparative bad faith" to the case of an employer suing its
former employee for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing supports the
assertion that, under some circumstances, such an action is possible. See supra notes 147-54
and accompanying text (insurance context).
183. Id.
184. Defendant made an "unconscionable claim for $4 million dollars" in punitive damages. The court described this as an "overzealous attempt on the part of defendants' counsel to
intimidate this and other plaintiffs from pursuing wrongful discharge litigation." Hudson, 609
F. Supp. at 480.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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trustor," is dependent on the other party, the fiduciary.1 87 The common
purpose of these tortious bad faith actions is to prevent the "entrustor"
from abusing the power with which it has been entrusted. 188 The "entrustor" is the insured in the context of insurance contracts, as is the
employee in the context of employment contract termination. In the
context of trade secrets, however, the entrustor is the employer.
It is possible then, for the balance of strength to shift in the employee's favor in certain circumstances. A party that is dependent (i.e.,
the entrustor) in some circumstances can be the stronger party (i.e., the
fiduciary) in others. 189
For example, when employees work with trade secrets, their "importance in a special sense increases ....The firm [has] to repose 'confidence' in the employee, to 'trust' him not to spread the information
outside the firm during and after the relationship."1 90 The employer can
be described as the "entrustor" when it comes to trade secrets,19 ' and the
"fiduciary" when it comes to administering company termination policy. 192 In short, when an employee occupies some position of special
trust and confidence with regard to matters essential to his employer's
business, that employee should appropriately be subject to a "heightened
duty" of conduct in which he must consider the employer's interests "as
193
tantamount to his own."'
This "heightened duty" concept is fully consistent with the policy
objectives underlying existing implied covenant cases. The general policy
objectives that are served by extending tort damages to breach of the
implied covenant are two-fold. On the one hand, the courts are concerned with protecting the heightened expectations that the entrustor
brings to a special relationship. 194 On the other hand, the courts attempt
to prevent the fiduciary from abusing his position of trust. 95 By extending the implied covenant cause of action to those employers that
must repose trust and confidence in their employees, 96 the law can provide a remedy that deters abuse of the "special relationship" and compensates the employer when existing contract or tort law now fails to do
187. Frankel, supra note 104, at 800 n.17.
188. Id. at 809-10; Note, supra note 116, at 865.
189. Frankel, supra note 104, at 800.
190. Robison, supra note 92, at 376.
191. See supra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text.
192. Cf Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529
(1984) (employee has right to the benefit of rules and regulations adopted for his benefit; employer has duty to apply those rules to insure that like cases are treated alike).
193. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129

(1984).
194. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
195. Frankel, supra note 104, at 816.
196. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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SO. 197 This is especially true when the employer is particularly vulnerable
to the loss of "key" personnel. 19 8

IV.

Employees' Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant: A
Viable Cause of Action?

As discussed above, since the law already provides tort relief for
breaches of certain common-law employee duties, the viability of extending tort liability to employees for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing remains in question.
197. The Wallis test, if rigorously required, will likely prevent an employer from asserting
an action based in the implied covenant because, the Hudson court reasoned, the employer is
almost never the "weaker" party economically. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 609 F.
Supp. 467, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 85-2176, slip op. (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1987).
By de-emphasizing economic strength, it is possible to imagine an instance, such as a
trade secrets dispute, in which the Wallis test might allow an employer to sue for employee's
breach of the implied covenant: (1) the employee entrusted with the use or creation of confidential information can arguably assume an equal or superior bargaining position, depending
upon the relevant value of that information to the employer. In the context of salary negotiations, for instance, the employee could "hold up" the employer for significant salary and fringe
benefit advantages against the unstated threat to divulge the information, or leave the company
prior to completion of the development work in process; (2) the employer might enter into
such an agreement with an employee to provide security of future operations; (3) if the employee left prematurely, or divulged the confidential information, the employer could possibly
suffer damages vis-a-vis lost opportunities and loss of competitive position far in excess of normal contract damages (i.e., employee's salary); (4) the employer could be especially vulnerable
to loss of "key" personnel and the attendant competitive advantage they represent; and (5) the
employee would likely be aware of the type and extent of the employer's vulnerability.
The Wallis test addresses many of the concerns that arise during the contract formation
stage, when "bargaining power" is most significant. Wallis arguably is not, however, flexible
enough to account for the results reached by the courts deciding the "comparative bad faith"
cases.
Perhaps a better way to describe the imbalance of power that the courts seek to equalize
by applying tort damages to breach of the implied covenant is to talk of the relative position of
trust that the party occupies, as either the "entrusted" or the "trusting." Frankel, supra note
104, at 800 n.17. This Note suggests that when the party is in the position of fiduciary (entrusted), then he should be liable in tort for breach of the implied covenant.
198. Commonwealth v. Levin, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 482, 484, 417 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1981)
("[K]ey man insurance ...enables a company to insure the life of a person whose continued
services are critical to the financial success of the company's business."). "Key man" insurance
is a relatively common condition precedent for receipt of loan approval or financing agreement
perfection in start-up ventures. In this manner, new research and development concerns can
recover damages sustained by the loss of critical creative personnel. The "key man" need not
be a corporate officer, director, manager, or other typically corporate "fiduciary." See, e.g..
Curtis v. Mendenhall, 208 Cal. App. 2d 834, 25 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1962) (entrepreneur with 20
years experience in venture was the "key man, his life [was] insured."); Gates v. American
Nat'l Bank, 173 Colo. 371, 479 P.2d 285 (1971) (key-man life insurance for the company
officers); McMullen v. St. Lucie County Bank, 128 Fla. 745, 175 S. 721 (1937) (bank secured
key man insurance for heavily indebted borrowers).

January 1988]

EMPLOYEES' GOOD FAITH DUTIES

A. Arguments For Employee's Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant
Actions
First, tort actions for breach of the duty of loyalty and breach of the
duty of secrecy are generally equitable actions. Damages are therefore
limited to the amount that the employer was harmed. These remedies
provide minimal deterrence against bad faith conduct.199 The availability of punitive damages for breach of the implied covenant might
deter
2°
employees in positions of trust from abusing their positions. 0
Additionally, some plaintiffs may face difficulties trying to "pigeonhole" their claims into a traditional tort. The availability of a general
tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would simplify pleading, and thus prove consistent with the goals of
20 1
modem fact pleading.
Finally, recognizing "comparative bad faith" as a "defense" or as an
offset to liability, 20 2 would add to the employer's
"arsenal" in the case of
20 3
a "wrongful termination" case against him.
More important, however, extension of tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing liability to employees in special positions of trust and confidence would maintain a consistency between
traditional common-law duties and the rapidly growing case law surrounding the implied covenant. The public interest in protecting the
"entrustor" and deterring abuse by the "entrusted" is firmly established
in the context of insurance contracts, and to a lesser degree employment
contract terminations, loan agreements, and other contexts. Certain employee's duties have been implied in law, or required by statute,2°4 with
the purpose of balancing the rights of the employer against those of the
employee.20 5 In the context of trade secret and loyalty disputes, the employer's property interests are balanced against the employee's interest in
advancing his career. 20 6 In the context of employment termination disputes, the court balances the employer's interest in maintaining manage199. See Note, supra note 116, at 864-65.
200. Id. at 859-61; Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, I Cal. 3d 93, 105, 460 P.2d 464, 470, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 597 (1969) (majority stockholders' manipulation of corporate stock, while clearly
damaging to minority shareholders, was not subject to legal remedy as minority shareholders
lacked standing to sue in diversity action); Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 264, 136
Cal. Rptr. 512, 520 (1977) (noting the inadequacy of equitable and compensatory damages to
provide remedy for defendant's breach of fiduciary duty).
201. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 238 (1985) ("A
vital aspect of pleading reform was application of a uniform set of rules to all cases, regardless
of the nature of the substantive cause.").
202. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
203. See Hudson v. Moore Business Machines, 609 F. Supp. 467, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 85-2176, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1987).
204. E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 541-51 (1980).
205. Note, supra note 129, at 985-86.
206. Id.
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ment control of its business against the employee's interests in job
security and non-discriminatory application of company policy. 20 7 In all
of these cases, the party entrusted with protecting the other party's interests (i.e., "fiduciary") is subject to tort liability. Consequently, in certain
situations, tort liability for employee breach of the covenant is both logical and appropriate.
B.

Arguments Against Employee's Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant
Actions

In contrast to the foregoing, significant reasons argue against allowing employers to assert tortious breach of the implied covenant
claims against former employees. First, employers already have available
a significant body of statutory and common-law actions to pursue against
employees who breach the duties required therein. Creation of a tort
tip the balance of
action based on the implied covenant might further
208
favor.
employer's
the
in
weighed
historically
power
Second, as the Hudson court recognized, providing employers with
as flexible a cause of action as tortious breach of the implied covenant
20 9
will allow them to "harass ... plaintiff[s] and scare off other litigants.
Thus, when faced with the "full weight and resources of the employer" 210 behind a claim seeking compensatory and punitive damages,
employees may be deterred from asserting their rights in meritorious
cases. This has not been the case with employers' common-law and statutory actions against former employees, perhaps due to the limited equitable remedies generally available under such actions. 2 1 Given that
most employees are relatively "judgment proof" against large claims
against them, it is unlikely that employers' claims for large damages
would be asserted offensively for other than harassment purposes.
Third, as recognized by Justice Kaus in White v. Western Title Insurance Company,21 2 while "there is tremendous pressure ... to extend
bad faith liability to other [than insurance] relationships ... it would be
disastrous if every contract were to be subjected to the same set of rules
which we have applied in the context of the insurer-insured relationship."'21 3 Although primarily concerned with subjecting ordinary contractors to "almost unlimited liability for punitive damages, ' 2 14 Justice
Kaus suggested that the rules to which the insurer-insured relationship
207. Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1984).
208. See supra note 117.
209. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 480.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
212. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 900, 710 P.2d 309, 327, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 527 (1985) (Kaus, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 900, 710 P.2d at 327-28, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28.
214. Id. at 900-02, 710 P.2d at 327-29, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28.
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are subject may not be appropriate to other contractual relationships.
While an insurer's good faith duties may be readily definable, 2 15 this has
apparently not been the case for employers.2 1 6 Other than the specific
duties to which the employee is already subject, 2 17 liability for amorphous good faith duties may only serve as a redundant, although powerful, tool for employers' abuse.
V.

Conclusion

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, originally a
contract interpretation device whose breach resulted in contract damages, is currently used by many jurisdictions to impose tort liability for
its breach in the context of "special" contracts. While courts offer various rationales to justify their use of the implied covenant in this fashion,
all agree that some contracts have significant policy implications. The
courts therefore embrace tort remedies to compensate plaintiffs more adequately and to deter wrongful conduct more effectively.
Early cases used the implied covenant to provide tort remedies to
insureds suing their carriers. Subsequent cases have extended these tortious breach actions to other contractual relationships displaying quasifiduciary characteristics. The courts have found this quasi-fiduciary relationship to exist in the context of surety contracts, loan agreements, commercial leases, and franchise agreements.
More recently, the courts have extended the "special relationship"
rationale into the employment context, allowing employees to state a
cause of action for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in certain wrongful discharge situations. The courts have yet to
hold an employee explicitly liable for tortious breach of the covenant.
Yet both law and logic suggest that such a cause of action might be appropriate when an employee abuses a special position of trust and confidence in relation to his employer.
The common law traditionally imputes heightened duties of loyalty
and confidentiality to an employee entrusted with interests belonging to
his employer. The cases and the statutes seek to balance the employer's
property interests with the employee's freedom to pursue his livelihood.
For example, when the employer entrusts its trade secrets or authority to
an employee, the employee is considered a fiduciary with respect to the
employer's interest, and is therefore required to consider the employer's
interest as tantamount to his own. In these cases, as in the implied covenant cases, the courts seek to deter and compensate for breach of agreements that require one party to entrust its interests to the other.
215. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
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Common-law duties traditionally imputed to employees protect the same
type of entrustment relationships protected by the implied covenant
actions.
Consequently, it is theoretically sound for an employer to state a
claim for employee's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of such an action, it may be desirable for the law to reject a tort cause of action in
favor of employers because such an action may deter employees from
bringing meritorious claims. The assertion of "comparative bad faith" as
an affirmative defense, however, would not represent the evils of an independent claim, and thus may reduce the "[irksome] surge in wrongful
discharge litigation" 2' 8 without subjecting employees to harassment and
intimidation.

218.

Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 480.

